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We the People, in Order to Form a More Perfect… Electoral College An analysis 
into electoral reform problems, proposals, and possibilities 
Abstract 
Given the structure of our Electoral College, there are places in the United States in which votes simply 
matter more. Many Americans believe the Electoral College is unfair, antiquated, and in desperate need of 
reform. However, alternative electoral proposals designed to reform our current system may not provide 
the benefits we seek from an ideal electoral process. In my thesis, I compare and contrast the current 
winner-takes-all method of allocating a state’s electoral votes to one of its most similar and realistic 
alternatives—the district plan. I compare the two systems against several criteria that are vital to a well-
functioning and healthy democratic process: legitimacy, inclusiveness, neutrality, simplicity, equality, 
participation, and feasibility. Overall, my results demonstrate that while the district plan might offer 
certain advantages—for example, increased electoral legitimacy, an expanded campaigning map, and the 
possibility for higher rates of voter turnout nationwide—these benefits are neither numerous nor profound 
when considering the immense hurdle of passing an electoral reform amendment. Ultimately, the future 
of electoral reform rests either on an emphatic embrace of the current system or an abolishment of the 
Electoral College and complete restructuring of the electoral process—no in-between compromise is 
worth the price. 
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Given the structure of our Electoral College, there are places in the United States in 
which votes simply matter more. Many Americans believe the Electoral College is unfair, 
antiquated, and in desperate need of reform. However, alternative electoral proposals designed to 
reform our current system may not provide the benefits we seek from an ideal electoral process. 
In my thesis, I compare and contrast the current winner-takes-all method of allocating a state’s 
electoral votes to one of its most similar and realistic alternatives—the district plan. I compare 
the two systems against several criteria that are vital to a well-functioning and healthy 
democratic process: legitimacy, inclusiveness, neutrality, simplicity, equality, participation, and 
feasibility. Overall, my results demonstrate that while the district plan might offer certain 
advantages—for example, increased electoral legitimacy, an expanded campaigning map, and 
the possibility for higher rates of voter turnout nationwide—these benefits are neither numerous 
nor profound when considering the immense hurdle of passing an electoral reform amendment. 
Ultimately, the future of electoral reform rests either on an emphatic embrace of the current 
system or an abolishment of the Electoral College and complete restructuring of the electoral 
process—no in-between compromise is worth the price. 
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 Voting is one of our most prized privileges in America. Our democratic process forms the 
foundation of American pride. Yet, our revered and celebrated system is so painstakingly, 
inherently, and obviously unequal. In the months leading up to the 2020 Presidential election, I 
moved from New Jersey to Pennsylvania. As a Pennsylvanian, I was bombarded with emails, 
texts, mailers, and messages from friends telling me that it was imperative that I voted in this 
election. This was quite the contrast from my experience as a New Jerseyan, where the get-out-
the-vote measures were practically silent. This stark contrast in my experiences between the two 
states was abundantly clear: in one place, I felt my vote mattered; in the other, I did not. I am 
motivated to write this thesis because I can’t stop asking myself: does it have to be this way? 
 Voting is the pinocle of equality in American democracy: every person is allocated one 
vote and one vote only. Not only is voting one of the most fervent symbols of equality, but it is 
also one of, if not the, most important and most utilized activities of an active citizen. According 
to Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics, 
“casting a ballot is, by far, the most common act of citizenship in democracy because electoral 
returns are decisive in determining who shall govern”.1 As Verba et. al explicate, voting is not 
only most important, but also the clearest and most direct act to realize institutional change. The 
perceptions of how impactful an individual vote can be in this process varies state to state. These 
perceptions and experiences cascade into all aspects of our political efficacy, especially 
individual motivation to cast a vote all. Therefore, not only does it matter that our vote matters, 
 
1 Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, et Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American 
Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 23. 
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but the most effective electoral system should maximize equalizing that power, (that feeling that 
“I matter”) for voters across the country. 
 For centuries, this question of whether our electoral system has to be this way has driven 
the call for electoral reform. Today, the majority of Americans believe the Electoral College is 
an unfair and antiquated system. At many instances throughout our history, we came close to 
effecting sweeping change; however, on the whole, the system has remained largely intact. If 
electoral reform has been a consistently popular measure over time, why hasn’t it happened? If 
our electoral system has been overwhelmingly dismissed as unfair, confusing, and outdated, 
what are we waiting for? If the winner-takes-all system is less than ideal, is the alternative any 
better? 
 A practical approach may offer the best avenue to answer these questions. The possible 
options that have been proposed over time—direct election, instant runoff, proportional plan, and 
so many more—could span the length of a dissertation, so I have decided to focus on comparing 
our current system with its most similar, most realistic alternative: the district plan. The district 
plan retains the Electoral College votes as we know it; however, it changes how they are 
allocated. Two electoral votes are awarded to the winner of the statewide popular vote and then 
the remaining electoral votes are allocated by congressional district—in other words, whoever 
wins the popular vote in that district gets the electoral vote. 
 By utilizing this method of comparison, I hope to unveil some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the Electoral College. While the disadvantages might be clear, the advantages 
may be hidden due to the fact that the system is always scrutinized in a vacuum. My plan is to 
examine the two electoral systems on a metric of several criteria relevant to a healthy and well-
function electoral process—legitimacy, inclusiveness, neutrality, simplicity, equality, 
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participation, and feasibility.  By analyzing these two systems in multiple ways, I start the 
process of revealing whether electoral reform is a dire must or more of a fantasy. Perhaps, the 








 Scholarship on the Electoral College, its effectiveness, and the possibilities for its reform 
spans decades, reaching as far back as the ratification of the Constitution itself. In my literature 
review, I analyze the findings of prominent scholars surrounding the heated debate and division 
over the Electoral College. Reform proposals are the alternative methods to the winner-takes-all 
method; the current method, observed by 48 states, allocates all of a state’s electoral votes to that 
state’s popular vote winner. I also analyze benefits and drawbacks of the two possibilities for 
electoral reform: proposals which would abolish the Electoral College in its entirety and those 
which would retain the Electoral College but employ alternative methods for allocating electors 
aside from the current winner-takes-all system. Ultimately, I demonstrate that Electoral College 
reform, and in essence, the implementation of any electoral system, is a series of tradeoffs 
between feasibility of implementation, political equality, and confidence in legitimacy and ease 
of recounts.  
 
Federalism as a Cornerstone of the Electoral System 
 
 Federalism is the backbone of the Framers’ conception of our electoral process, yet 
today, in the debate among scholars and citizens alike, it is both one of the most celebrated 
elements and the largest roadblocks to electoral success. Federalism is cemented in the Electoral 
College in four distinct ways: 1) appointment of electors by state legislatures, 2) the two electors 
representing senatorial seats that each state is allotted, 3) and the process of invoking a house 
contingency election which is used when the electoral winner fails to reach a majority of the 
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vote, and 4) states differing in how they structure the elections that select the electors.  Robert 
Hardaway, a proponent of federalism and of preserving the framers’ intentions of the Electoral 
College, details in his book, Saving the Electoral College: Why the national popular vote would 
Undermine Democracy, that the crucial role of the two senatorial seats, “reflects the weight that 
each state will be given in the presidential elections process.” Hardaway demonstrates that these 
two seats are more than simply ceremonial; changes to vote allocation would undermine the 
power that states, do and should have in the process. Randall E. Adkins and Kent A. Kirwan, on 
the other hand, highlight the nuance of federalism in the fight for a perfect electoral system: 
“federalism is often the main target of those who would abolish the Electoral College as well as 
the primary feature that prevents ratification of a constitutional amendment to abolish it.” This 
quote demonstrates that federalism lies at the heart of this frustrating debate; any attempts to 
extract it from the electoral process must be heavily scrutinized. 
Hardaway, as well as other lawmakers, demonstrate further not only why federalism 
matters but what is its function in the democratic process. Hardaway quotes John F. Kennedy in 
his defense of federalism: “direct election would break down the ‘federal system’...[which] 
provides a system of checks and balances to ensure that no area or group shall obtain too much 
power.”2 Checks and balances, a core tenet established throughout the Constitution, as Kennedy 
demonstrates and Hardaway echoes, is just as essential in the electoral process as anywhere else. 
Gary E. Bugh, another prominent scholar on electoral reform, expands on the role of federalism 
beyond just as an arbiter of checks and balances. He discusses the heated debate that surrounded 
the 1970 Senate resistance to direct election stating that the popular vote would eliminate the 
very heart of constitutional order, community. More specifically, he cites Senator James Strom 
 
2 Robert M. Hardaway, 1. 
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Thurmond (R-SC), who believed that federalism was designed to preserve the inseparable nature 
between the individual person and their community.3 According to these scholars and American 
leaders, the federalism of the Electoral College is emblematic of America’s core precepts: 
preservation of the bond between individual and local community as well as a system of checks 
and balances between powerful political factions.    
 
The Framers’ Vision for Electing the President 
 
 While the framers’ were empathetic about maintaining federalism throughout the 
Constitution, an investigation into their enthusiasm and confidence in the Electoral College 
allows scholars today to sincerely question our attachment to an electoral system that its creators 
may have, themselves, been misguided in loving.4 George C. Edwards, one of the prominent and 
outspoken proponents of abolishing the Electoral College details in his book, Why the Electoral 
College is Bad for America, that there was little debate over the Electoral College after it was 
ratified. This lack of debate led some framers such as Alexander Hamilton to feel confident in 
the plan. However, Edwards points out that this “confidence” could have been a result of 
Constitutional Convention fatigue and a desire to avoid further disagreement over constitutional 
elements which had been belabored.5 While the framers’ believed federalism in our Electoral 
College to be invaluable, revaluating the notion that the Electoral College is the best practical 
implementation of that vision is worthwhile. 
 
3 Gary E. Bugh, “Representation In Congressional Efforts to Amend the Presidential Election System,” in Electoral 
College Reform: Challenged and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 15–16. 
4 Adkins, “What Role Does the ‘Federalism Bonus’ Play in Presidential Selection?,” 75. 
5 George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press 
Books, 2019), 102–4. 
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Edwards illustrates several key factors which were instrumental to the Framers’ choice to 
create the Electoral College as we know it today. First, the framers hoped to limit electoral fraud 
and believed the Electoral College method promised the “detached existence” of electors. They 
believed this structure would prevent the electors, and the overall system, from being susceptible 
to bribery. Most notably, however, framers were unconvinced that under a direct election system 
the electorate could make informed and reasonable choices. Yet, Edwards notes that many 
delegates were in favor of direct election, and despite this support, there was legitimate concern 
regarding its implication, particularly how to appropriately control for the population sizes which 
greatly differed from state to state. The Electoral College made sense to the framers not only as a 
way to prevent bribery and confer legitimacy, but also as a compromise to adhere to the interests 
of both large and small states.6  
Hardaway provides a vastly different portrayal than Edwards of the framers’ intentions in 
creating the Electoral College. According to Hardaway, understanding how the framer’s intended 
the Electoral College to function is best done when looking at the Constitution as a whole 
document: “such intent is best gleaned by considering the entire Constitution in context”.7 While 
Edwards certainly provides more concrete reasons for exactly which intentions drove the 
creation of the Electoral College, both historians apply a slightly biased slant in recounting this 
origin story, both which further their respective preferences on the Electoral College. Michael T. 
Rogers provides yet another interesting voice in the conversation in his article, “A Mere 
Deception- A Mere Ignus Fatus on the People of America” in stating that  
“most opponents to the popular election at the Convention provide reasons that are not 
consistent with the common assumption today that the founders distrusted the common 
man and the representative democracy as a mechanism for choosing the chief magistrate. 
In actuality, most opposition appears to stem, on the one hand from logistical impracticality 
 
6 George C. Edwards III, 104–18. 
7 Robert M. Hardaway, Saving the Electoral College: Why the Popular Vote Would Undermine Democracy, 32. 
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in a county of the scale of the United States (especially given limited technology and such 
a locally oriented people).”8 
 
Rogers’ description sheds light on how practical considerations, especially in detailing 
protocol regarding how they would physically implement an election on such a wide scale with 
limited technology, plagued the framers to such an extent, and this fact is often lost on 
Americans today. Edwards, Hardaway, and Rogers provide three distinct interpretations of the 
framers’ intentions—while all valuable—their differences clarify that weight given to any one or 
two particular considerations that the framers might have had is not as helpful in evaluating the 
Electoral College as it would be to measure it against the current needs of the country. 
 
The Electoral College as a Pro-Slavery Tool 
 
Not only did the Electoral College protect the interests of slaveholders, under this system 
college slaveholders had undue power and consequential effect in presidential elections. Because 
slaves counted as 3/5 of a person, southern states received an electoral bonus through their slave 
population.9 This bonus equated nearly 60% of the slave state population, which served as an 
incentive for these states to enslave even more people.10 For example, in 1790, Virginia and 
Pennsylvania had the same number of free white men, but Virginia’s additional 300,000 slaves 
allotted the state six more House seats and therefore six more electoral votes.11 This 
disproportionate power of southern states was known as “Slave Power”, and it impacted the 
electoral process as early as the presidential election of 1800. The election was decided by a 
 
8 Michael T. Rogers, “A Mere Deception- A Mere Ignus Fatus on the People of America,” in Electoral College 
Reform: Challenges and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 18. 
9 George C. Edwards III, 104–18. 
10 Jesse Wegman, Let the People Pick the President (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2020), 74. 
11 Jesse Wegman, 105. 
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House of Representatives vote, where Thomas Jefferson, the favored candidate in slaveholding 
states, won the Electoral College vote 73-65 due to the additional 12-14 votes he received from 
“slave-representing” representatives.12 Jefferson would not have beat the incumbent John Adams 
without the help of “Slave Power”, revealing some of the most harrowing and detrimental effects 
of the Electoral College. The complex relationship between the Electoral College, slavery, and 
its role in propagating it, illustrates that this system for electing the president is in fact a relic of 
the past and may be unfit to appropriately adhere to the needs of our electorate today. 
 
Direct Election: Electoral Proposals without the Electoral College   
 
The direct election plan, which would establish a winner by the national popular vote and 
abolish the Electoral College, is both popular and promising because it prioritizing political 
equality above all else.13 Political equality, by definition, gives equal weight to every single 
voter’s ballot, and “provides all citizens with a way to engage in civic activity and have a voice 
in the governing process”.14 A concept known as, “one person, one vote”.15 Scholars such as 
George C. Edwards argue that direct election is the best if not the only option because the 
concept of political equality should not only be a significant consideration, it should take 
priority, lying at the core of the electoral process.16 Direct election is undeniably the electoral 
option which champions political equality the best, and therefore it is unsurprising that, 




12 Jesse Wegman, 105. 
13 Gary E. Bugh, “Representation In Congressional Efforts to Amend the Presidential Election System,” 8. 
14 Gary E. Bugh, 8. 
15 Gary E. Bugh, 13. 
16 George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 39. 
17 George C. Edwards III, 40. 
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Electoral College Proposals: Alternative Ways to Allocate Electors 
While direct election is perhaps the most well-known, revolutionary, and favored reform 
policy, it is only one of the many reforms which has received congressional consideration. 
Proposals such as the district plan, proportional plan, and the national popular vote interstate 
compact, retain the Electoral College but envision alternative methods for allocating electors as 




 The district plan involves allocating two electoral votes to the winner of the statewide 
popular vote and then allocates remaining electoral votes by congressional district, namely 
whoever wins the popular vote in that district gets the electoral vote.18 The district plan has been 
debated by Congress since 1800 and throughout the nineteenth century.19Most notably, this plan 
stands out to the other reform measures because it has been successfully implemented by two 
states: Maine and Nebraska. Another similar proposal to the district plan is the lesser-known 
District-Popular plan which is a blend of the district plan and direct election. Under this plan, 
every congressional district would receive one vote and instead of the two at-large votes being 





18 Michael J. Korzi, “‘If the Manner of It Be Not Perfect’: Thinking Through Electoral College Reform,” 52–53. 
19 Craig J. Herbst, “Redrawing the Electoral Map: Reforming the Electoral College with the District-Popular Plan 
Note,” Hofstra Law Review 41, no. 1 (2013 2012): 238. 
20 Herbst, “Redrawing the Electoral Map,” 239. 
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 The proportional plan would require electors and electoral votes to be allocated in each 
state according to the percentage of the popular votes won by the candidates in that state.21 One 
of the greatest questions surrounding the proportional plan is how to translate non-integer 
percentages of candidate popular support to electoral votes. Colorado voted on the proportional 
allocation of its’ electors in 2004. While the state voted against the provision, had it been passed 
the process for allocating the votes would have involved taking the percentage of the vote each 
ticket received, multiplying it by Colorado’s nine electoral votes, and then rounding up or down 
this figure to the nearest whole number.22  
 
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact 
 
 The National Popular Vote (NPV) interstate compact is an initiative which would achieve 
the direct popular election of the president and vice president without a congressional 
amendment.23 Any state which agrees to the compact, will immediately award all of its electors 
to the winner of the popular vote regardless of who wins the plurality of votes in that state.24 As 
of now, 15 states and the District of Columbia have approved of the plan, which encompasses a 
total of 196 electoral votes.25 The plan would come into effect once enough states have agreed to 
it so that the majority of electoral votes needed to elect the president (270 of the 538) would 
automatically be distributed to the winner of the national vote.26 
 
21 Robert T. Miller, Electoral College: An Analysis (New York, UNITED STATES: Nova Science Publishers, 
Incorporated, 2011), 26, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/upenn-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3019540. 
22 Miller, 27. 
23 Thomas H Neale and Andrew Nolan, “The National Popular Vote (NPV) Initiative: Direct Election of the President 
by Interstate Compact,” n.d., 36. 
24 Neale and Nolan. 
25 Neale and Nolan. 
26 George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 210. 
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Two of the primary factors which contributed to the rise of the national popular vote 
initiative were  the several decades of unsuccessful efforts to pass a constitutional amendment 
that would implement a direct election system the results of the 2000 election.  The 2000 election 
marked the first time since 1888 elected a candidate to office who won the majority of electoral 
votes but did not win the popular vote.27 The 2000 “misfire” contributed to a flurry of research 
and scholarship into electoral reform possibilities. Project FairVote, an issue advocacy group, 
nonprofit, and nonpartisan organization is known to be the birthplace of the initiative. The plan 
has become well known under its manifesto: Every Vote Equal. 28 
 
Direct Election: Benefits 
The direct election method, with its absence of electors and therefore lack of 
intermediaries between the electorate and the election, is simple, straightforward, and to many 
better legitimizes results than the current system.29 Michael J. Korzi highlights that under this 
plan there would no longer be any scenarios, like 2000 and 2016, where a “wrong winner” would 
be chosen because no longer can there be a gap between the popular vote and the Electoral 
College winner.30 Like Korzi, George C. Edwards criticizes the need for intermediaries as well, 
yet supporters of the Electoral College deem the electors to be essential for easily translating 
popular vote wins into electoral wins, legitimizing the electoral process. Defining legitimacy of 
our electoral process, therefore, is at the crux of this debate because pro-direct election scholars 
 
27 Neale and Nolan, “The National Popular Vote (NPV) Initiative: Direct Election of the President 
by Interstate Compact.” 
28 Neale and Nolan. 
29 George C. Edwards III, 43. 
30 Michael J. Korzi, “‘If the Manner of It Be Not Perfect’: Thinking Through Electoral College Reform,” in Electoral 
College Reform: Challenges and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 53. 
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such as Edwards deem the direct election to be the only sure path to legitimacy because there 
could be no discrepancy between who the people want and who is chosen, while Electoral 
College loyalists confer legitimacy through large margins in electoral wins. To Edwards and 
Korzi, even four elections where the popular vote and electoral winner diverge is too many, 
demonstrating the electoral system as we know it, as unreliable.31 
The current system biases not only how campaigns make decisions, but whose voices 
they prioritize. Amongst first-term administrations, where second elections are on the line, 
presidents bias those same places when making presidential visits, allocating funds, and 
prioritizing policy implementation.32 The undue power that these places hold is a side-effect of 
this system and is why so many demand direct election. Jesse Wegman, in his book, Let the 
People Pick the President, discusses how direct election might change the landscape of 
campaigning, expanding the electoral map dramatically. Not only would direct election impact 
the sheer number of states that candidates would visit, but it would alter how federal funds are 
allocated in presidential policymaking. Wegman explicates how presidents have directed the 
most funds to swing states where electoral payoff will be greatest. However, under a vastly 
different electoral plan such as direct election, “presidents could use discretionary grants and 
funds to address the needs of people in states everywhere, including those that currently get 
ignored.”33 Direct election provides an equal weight given to all voices, which expands not only 
to the elections process but to governing as well. 
Through political equality and wide-spread campaign attention thanks to an expanded 
electoral map, many believe direct election would necessarily encourage increased political 
 
31 George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America, 43. 
32 Brendan J. Doherty, “Electoral College Incentives and Presidential Actions: A Case for Reform?”, in Electoral 
College Reform: Challenges and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 184. 
33 Jesse Wegman, Let the People Pick the President (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2020), 250. 
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participation nationwide.34 While this belief is grounded in sound theoretical reasoning, it is often 
disputed. While there is no doubt that voter participation is higher in battleground states, there is 
some speculation that being in a “safe state” does not necessarily decrease the state’s voter 
turnout and discourage anyone from voting, ultimately questioning if there would be same effect 
on voter turnout if implemented nationwide.35 In addition to a potential increase in voter turnout, 
many speculate that under direct election, the parties would be forced into the middle, where the 
political parties would have to employ the most moderate policy position to appeal to the largest 
number of voters. For example, Democrats would need to compete for rural votes and 
Republicans for Latino voters.36 Direct election provides many benefits: legitimizing the election, 
expanding the campaign map, moderating the political parties, and championing political 
equality, where every vote can make the same small but consequential impact.  
 
Electoral College Proposals: Benefits 
 
Reasons to consider retaining the Electoral College but reallocating electors highlights 
the benefits of the Electoral College while still allowing for its scrutiny and small-scale changes. 
the Electoral College has been revered by political scientists as consistently and continually 
providing the country with legitimate electoral results. Paul D. Schumacher, unlike Korzi and 
Edwards, deems electoral victory as the driving force how presidents acquire legitimacy. Two 
factors of the Electoral College provide this legitimacy: 1) the Electoral College converts slim 
 
34 Jesse Wegman, 252. 
35 Keena Lipsitz, “The Consequences of Battleground and ‘Spectator’ State Residency for Political Participation,” 
Political Behavior 31, no. 2 (July 29, 2008): 187, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-008-9068-7. 
36 Jesse Wegman, Let the People Pick the President, 256. 
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popular vote margins into decisive victories, 2) it reduces the extensiveness of recount activities 
that a national vote could require.37 
Aside from legitimacy and accessibility and ease of necessary recounts, another benefit 
of the Electoral College is that it reinforces the two-party system and thwarts the possibility of 
third-party candidates unexpectedly taking the presidency. Voters are encouraged not to waste 
their votes on unelectable candidates under this system.38 According to Alexandra Kura in her 
book Electoral College and the Presidential Elections, the “winner-take-all method” to the 
creation and endurance of the two-party system and has encouraged coalition building which 
have created “inclusive” political parties. Kura highlights advantages of this system by stating 
that the “American parties have historically shown the ability to maintain broad appeal by 
incorporating new principles and policies in their platforms.”39 Yet, strengthening the two-party 
system is not always celebrated by scholars. Schumacher, for example, disagrees that an electoral 
system should aim to strengthen the two-party system. He finds that the Electoral College is 
flawed because it undermines sincere voting since voters must choose the most electable 
candidate instead of the candidate which best represents their interests.40  
Additionally, Robert Hardaway highlights the messiness that electoral reform plans 
would bring to campaigning, especially under direct election. 41 Many other authors exclude the 
discussion of campaigning as one of the many benefits of the Electoral College today because of 
the widespread dissatisfaction with how it currently operates. The Electoral College under 
 
37 Paul D. Schumacher, “‘The Good, the Better, the Best: Improving on the “Acceptable” Electoral College,’” in 
Electoral College Reform: Challenges and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 213. 
38 Paul D. Schumacher, 209. 
39 Alexandra Kura, Electoral College and Presidential Elections (Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 
2001), 52–53. 
40 Paul D. Schumacher, 209. 
41 Robert M. Hardaway, Saving the Electoral College: Why the Popular Vote Would Undermine Democracy, 67. 
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winner-takes-all allows for a relative ease and structure to large-scale national campaigning since 
candidates can easily pinpoint key areas of interest, however “ease” and “structure”, to many 
scholars, should not be the goal of campaigns. Legitimacy, ease of recount, and endurance of the 




Currently adopted by two states, the district plan acts as middle ground between direct 
election and winner-takes-all; it upholds the power of small states, making it feasible for 
implementation and retaining federalism, but is more equitable than the current system, 
expanding electoral influence on smaller but more numerous districts nationwide.42 Winning 
small-state approval for electoral reform can be nearly impossible, however, in Mark J. 
McKenzie’s analysis of systemic biases which affect congressional voting on Electoral College 
reform, he reveals the immense popularity of the district system amongst the Plains and Southern 
states during the 1960 House vote. Small states were pro-district plan, as opposed to large-state 
representatives who opposed plan because it weakened their influence by breaking up the 
electoral votes.43 Consistent with the preservation of small state power, the district plan is the 
reform option which is most consistent with the original aim of the framers’ vision for 
federalism; it places value on community and a system of checks and balances.44 Additionally, 
advocates for the district popular plan as well as the district plan praise its ability to disperse and 
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widen the competitive places on the electoral map, expand campaigning, and encourage voter 
turnout.45 As the goldilocks of electoral reform plans, the district method presents mild 




Proponents of the proportional plan consider it to be the fairest of all measures because it 
most accurately reflects the preferences of voters. The plan similarly provides recognition and 
substantial electoral allocation for third party candidates.46 Many versions of the proportional 
plan eliminate the need for human electors which would eliminate the concern of faithless 
electors.47 In Henry Cabot Lodge’s Senate promotion of the proportional plan in 1950, he stated 
stating that it would preserve and protect the rights of small states.48 However, further analysis of 
the reality of implementing this plan demonstrates that small states have little to gain from this 
plan, since dividing up an already small number of electoral votes has marginal benefits, whereas 
large state could see instrumental changes under this system.49 
 
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact 
The National Popular Vote initiative plan side-steps what has seen to be the greatest 
obstacle to Electoral College reform—passing a constitutional amendment.50 The initiative is 
advantageous because it addresses main objections to the Electoral College. First, the plan 
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champions political equality, counting all votes equally. Second, there would no longer be a 
“wrong” winner chosen in an election due to a gap between the Electoral College winner and the 
national popular vote winner.51 The plan has attracted considerable support, has been 
accompanied by powerful scholarship, and incorporates support from the public in that the 
majority of Americans want to see Electoral College reform which includes the direct election of 
the president.52 As recently as the 2020 election, Colorado voted to stay in the compact. The state 
joined the compact last year, yet a repeal effort ended up on the ballot during the most recent 
election.53 Colorado’s voter-driven approval of the plan could indicate the rise of support from 
“swing-like” states, a significant differentiation from the entirely democratic slate of states that 
have previously joined the compact, giving the compact hope for a future with bipartisan 
support. 
 
Direct Election: Drawbacks 
 
While some scholars view direct election to be the best way to reflect the true interests of 
the nation, others view it as a disaster for electoral legitimacy and election security. One of the 
reasons for the lack of confidence in the direct election plan is that there is uncertainty to 
whether a plurality or a majority is necessary for deciding a winner.54 If the outcome of the 
national popular vote is extremely close, doubts about the legitimacy of the election could ensue, 
especially if the winner did not receive a majority of the votes. However, to combat these 
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concerns, reform plans have proposed instant runoff between two top finishing candidates under 
these circumstances.55 Another one of the major issues with the plan, is the is the chaotic nature 
of recounts if needed.56 Scholarship presented in this literature review on the direct election plan 
predated the chaotic aftermath of the 2020 election, in which false allegations of election fraud 
ran rampant. Due to the unprecedented and abrupt shift in the political climate on election 
certainty, new light is shed on the importance of election legitimacy and ease of widespread 
recounts in any reform measure, which previous scholarship may not have emphasized. Most 
notably, direct election, the most drastic change to the electoral process, poses concerns 
regarding how feasible it would be to implement an amendment for it. Congress would be 
challenged to achieve small state approval of the plan because it effectively strips small states of 
their power in the Electoral College.  
 
Electoral College Proposals: Drawbacks 
 
The Electoral College, currently praised for providing the most legitimate and secure 
electoral results, harbors “hidden landmines”, while rare, could greatly hinder its effects of 
legitimacy. Those landmines are: 1) invoking of a House contingency election as well as 2) the 
possibility of faithless electors.57 Jesse Wegman, like Korzi and Edwards, discusses how the 
Electoral College can have the opposite effect—a lack of legitimacy—when either the popular 
vote winner and the Electoral College winner are different or one of the landmines listed above 
comes into effect.58 Robert Hardaway agrees with the Electoral College’s ability to ensure 
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legitimacy. He reminds critics of the Electoral College that a direct election system could involve 
nightmarish recounts in every state and every precinct in the country if the results were 
disputable or too close to call.59 Wegman, on the other hand, recalls how America’s faith is 
shaken when the Electoral College winner and national winner do not align (which has been 
particularly salient in the last decade). In response to this claim, Hardaway draws attention to the 
200 plus years in which the Electoral College has provided the country with reputable, reliable, 
and indistinguishable results that have laid the groundwork for peaceful transition of power.60 
Legitimacy is the one of the greatest advantages of the Electoral College. However, rare, but 
possible, scenarios of a House contingency elections, faithless electors, or popular vote mismatch 




The district plan, while theoretically advantageous, brings to light concerns regarding 
how effective it would be at increasing competitive areas and political equality. While the plan 
appears to democratize the electoral process even further by expanding the reach of campaigns to 
“swing districts” as opposed to “swing states” the amount of House districts which are 
competitive in the House election is a disappointing reality. The non-competitiveness of 90% of 
House races does not bode well for potential competitiveness in a national district plan, 
subsequent campaign attention that districts would receive, and increasing voter turnout.61 
However, this analysis of the system assumes that individuals would treat House elections the 
same as presidential elections. Robert C. Turner, for example, addresses the main concerns of the 
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district plan in his analysis, “The Contemporary Presidency: Do Nebraska and Maine have the 
Right Idea? The Political and Partisan Implications of the District System” by analyzing the 2000 
Presidential results from the district perspective. His findings demonstrate the district system 
would create a broader electoral coalition than the system as is, and it would increase the 
competitiveness of the congressional elections. 
With a transition from swing states to swing districts under this plan, new demographic 
concerns are brought to light. Turner finds that the district system has a strong demographic and 
partisan bias, wherein the plan disenfranchises minorities groups further and give 
disproportionate electoral advantages to Republican candidates.62 Turner highlights these 
concerns; however, his scope is limited to 1992-2000 congressional districts. While further 
investigation of Turner’s allegations is imminent, the increased competitiveness and relevance of 
districts alone make them subject to corruption and partisan interference. As recent as January 
2021, Wisconsin has proposed a plan to implement the district plan, which has come under 
heavy criticism because of the implications for gerrymandering in the state if implemented. One 
elections researcher, Barry Burden, remarks that that gerrymandering is, “already an ugly 
process but it will be on steroids if those districts affect not only the control of Congress but also 
control of the presidency”.63 These allegations against the district plan are not to be taken lightly; 
the district plan appears to champion compromise while in actuality has the potential to do some 
real damage to the democratic process. 
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The proportional plan is complex—probably the most of all the reform plans—and 
scholars have referenced its complexity as the greatest reason to avoid this reform. George C. 
Edwards raises concerns that it could never achieve a constitutional amendment, making it 
highly unfeasible, while other critics warn of electoral deadlocks.64 The proportional plan would 
not have prevented electoral deadlock in 1960, 1968, 1992, 1996, and 2000. Elections in 1968, 
1992, and 1996 would have been contentious mostly due to third party candidates in the race. 
Thomas Neale in his article, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Elections, 
echoes this point, arguing that the proportional plan would only lead to an increasing number of 
deadlocked elections.65 George C. Edwards warns that the proportional plan would have caused 
Mitt Romney to win in the 2012 election, prompting questions of the massive alterations the plan 
would have on electoral victories. While many praise Electoral College reform plans which 
encourage third parties, Edwards warns of the proportional plan’s tendency to elevate third party 
candidates and the “mischief that third parties can cause in contingent elections”.66 Michael 
Korzi warns that if third party candidates take even 10 electoral votes away from major party 
candidates, the election could be sent to the House of Representatives—a harrowing thought for 
the legitimacy and stability of our electoral system and presidential victories.67 The rise in 
relevance of third parties which some Electoral College reform plans encourage, has been hotly 
debated amongst scholars as to whether it is an advantage or a disadvantage to the electoral 
process. 
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 Yet, the greatest issue of complexity lies in the plan’s implementation. While the 2004 
proportional plan proposal in Colorado had detailed plans for the how the state would handle 
issues of rounding, implementing the proportional plan nationally would necessarily lead to great 
controversy with determining issues of rounding. If rounding policy vastly different state to state, 
we could only imagine that our already complex electoral system would become even more 
complex and difficult to understand.68  Ultimately, simplicity in an electoral system is an 
increasingly relevant factor in constructing it,  because greater internal political efficacy—or the 
self-perception that an individual is capable of understanding politics—provides more citizens 
with the competence and thus the confidence to participate in political acts such as (and most 
importantly to an electoral system) voting. 69 
 A major gap in the literature on the proportional plan whether the plan holds a 
demographic bias. When Henry Cabot Lodge brought the plan to the Senate in 1950, he framed 
the invention of the plan as fighting “Pivotal State Evil” which he felt dominated the electoral 
map. He described this evil as the major parties giving “undue attention to the demands and 
programs of relatively unimportant groups or factions”.70 Ultimately, proportional supporters 
found it troubling that parties were concentrating their efforts on policy that would benefit 
minorities in urban areas also known as “the unimportant groups or factions” that Lodge refers 
to.71 While Lodge brought the proportional plan to the Senate floor with hopes of thwarting the 
interests of minorities in urban areas, the plan’s implementation raises questions of how it would 
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impact minority voters today, and if there would be an increased benefit or further 
disenfranchisement compared to the current system. 
 
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact 
The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, while appealing because it sidesteps the 
hurdle of a constitutional amendment, raises questions of legality, simplicity, and legitimacy. 
Primarily, the legality of the compact is the often the first point of disapproval from many 
scholars. Article 1, section 10 of the constitution prohibits states from entering into any 
“agreement or Compact with another state” without the consent of Congress, and it has been 
unclear whether this agreement falls under that precise distinction.72 The Supreme Court has 
drawn distinctions between compacts dealing with a variety of different concerns and many 
proponents of the NPV initiative argue that based on those precedents congressional approval is 
not necessary for this plan.73 Additionally, the plan might complicate how voters come to 
understand election results. A voter’s state may have an apparent winner, yet the state’s electoral 
votes will automatically be attributed to another candidate, easily creating more confusion and 
complexity amongst voters. Additionally, federalism is largely removed from the electoral 
system under this plan; while electors exist, they become irrelevant and purely ceremonial.74  
Critics of the plan say that it is chaotic; relying on a national popular vote tabulation with 
strict accuracy, and reliability of recounting would be fraught with challenges and missteps.75 
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Scholars are concerned about the limitations of statutes regarding the plan. Whereas an 
amendment to the constitution would be “set in stone” to a large extent, predicating the entire 
electoral system on a statute is far less reliable and durable over time.76 The plan attracts plentiful 
criticisms in addition to the ones listed above, yet one that is often forgotten and played down is 
the issue of faithless electors with the initiative because there is no national popular vote 
proposal or laws forbidding faithless electors.77 However, in July of 2020 the Supreme Court 
ruled that states have clear power to require their presidential electors to vote for their party’s 
candidate, eliminating some of the major concerns with faithless electors in any electoral system 
which retains the Electoral College, but particularly with the initiative. 78 
Yet, the greatest concern with the plan is its feasibility, particularly because the plan is 
far from gaining bipartisan approval. The compact has been widely criticized by Republicans in 
recent years for having a clear bias towards Democratic candidates. However, according to Jesse 
Wegman in his book, Let the People Pick the President, that has not always been the case. John 
Koza, the author of the plan, was concerned that because the initial handful of states which 
passed the initiative were Democratic the plan would look to Republicans as if it was a partisan 
ploy to steal the White House, despite the fact that he has always viewed the plan as a bipartisan 
way to elect the president.79 After the 2012 Obama reelection, Republican lawmakers grew more 
open to the idea, however the 2016 election—almost instantly—prompted conservative support 
for the initiative to vanish.80 The vastly partisan misconceptions regarding the plan have resulted 
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in fruitless results over the years, and demonstrates how bipartisan support for any electoral 
reform plan is instrumental to enacting any kind of progress towards a better electoral system. 
 
The Problem of Faithless Electors 
 
 The issue of faithless electors is often forgotten because it rarely occurs, yet not only is it 
a concern that plagues all of the reform plans which retain the Electoral College and human 
electors, it can have drastic implications on outcomes of elections and our confidence in them. 
The founding fathers created this mechanism to protect the American people from the dangers of 
a demagogue, since they could act freely against election results if they believed the people had 
chosen an unfit leader.81 Alexander Hamilton, believed that with electors “no corruption” could 
be possible with this system because of their “detached experience” from the larger electorate.82 
However, as Jesse Wegman explicates in his book, there has not be a single body of electors 
since 1792 which have been, “independent, deliberative actors who saw their task as picking the 
fittest person for the job”.83 In fact, each presidential candidate has his or her own pre-picked 
slate of electors. These electors are sworn to partisan loyalty and are sent to the state capital on 
the day the Electoral College votes in order to cast votes for their party’s candidate if that party 
wins the state popular vote.84  
Furthermore, many states have laws punishing electors if they decide to stray away from 
the state’s popular vote winner, and as detailed above, the Supreme Court has emphasized that 
states have this right in the July 2020 ruling.85 All congressional reform plans—such as the 
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automatic plan—which would eliminate the need for human electors and automatically require 
every state to utilize the “winner takes all” method failed to receive congressional approval. 
Therefore, not only do electors not necessarily uphold the partisan and unbiased vision of the 
framers, they remain living, breathing, autonomous actors which can, in those states which do 
not have laws against it, vote for the candidate that they believe would best represent the 
interests of the nation.86  
 In 2016, a handful of electors felt that it was their patriotic duty to do just that. Michael 
Baca, a member of the Electoral College from Colorado, realized that it would only take 37 
rogue Republican electors to prevent Donald Trump from winning and ultimately throw the 
election to the House of Representatives, which had not happened since 1825. Baca tried to 
organize a coalition of faithless electors through an organization he called the Hamilton Electors. 
On Electoral College day, only 10 electors ended up breaking their pledges and many of those, 
including Baca’s, had been invalidated by the state and required a different elector to step in and 
recast the vote.87 Ultimately, the plan of the Hamilton Electors did not succeed but it did remind 
the American public that the freedom of electors can have some potentially drastic consequences, 
especially in elections where the electoral win is very thin. 
 Despite Alexander Hamilton’s vision of a “detached experience” of electors, scholarship 
demonstrates that electors are often subject to powerful attempts at persuasion and lobbying. 
Robert M. Alexander, in his article, Lobbying the Electoral College: The Potential for Chaos, 
analyzed the incidence of faithless electors in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. He 
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explicitly analyzed the effects of lobbying campaigns on those electors to change their votes.88 
The 2000 election was fraught with lobbying efforts, as one might assume given the 
contentiousness of the election outcome. Electors were bombarded with emails, telephone calls, 
even grassroots campaigns, the most notable being Citizens for True Democracy. These 
campaigns mobilized to encourage Republican electors to vote against their party.89 Alexander 
surveyed the electors by sending all 538 members of both election’s Electoral College members 
mail-in surveys.90 Alexander’s findings demonstrate that large numbers of presidential electors 
were lobbied to change their votes, and many of the electors gave significant consideration to 
defecting, however none of them actually did.91 
 Supporters of the Electoral College often remind critics that the issue of faithless electors 
can be a problem in whatever electoral plan retains their autonomy, most notably the National 
Popular Vote Interstate Compact.92 The issue of faithless electors, therefore, should be more 
relevant in the conversations that scholars and politicians are having about the Electoral College 
today. While faithless electors have never implemented any consequential changes on election 
outcomes—there only being 165 incidences of faithless in the history of the Electoral College to 
date—the ease of even one faithless elector in disenfranchising thousands upon thousands of 
voters and create large uncertainty and illegitimacy of the election results in the eyes of the 
American public cannot be understated.93 
 
 
88 Robert M. Alexander, “Lobbying the Electoral College: The Potential for Chaos,” in Electoral College Reform: 
Challenges and Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 160. 
89 Robert M. Alexander, 163. 
90 Robert M. Alexander, 164. 
91 Robert M. Alexander, 170–71. 
92 Robert M. Hardaway, Saving the Electoral College: Why the Popular Vote Would Undermine Democracy, 111. 
93 Robert M. Alexander, “Lobbying the Electoral College: The Potential for Chaos,” 165. 
 34 
An Alternative Election Procedure: Ranked Choice Voting 
 
 Electoral reform is not limited to alterations to electoral vote alone, in fact, many reform 
measures propose innovative methods to how citizens vote for candidates; one of the most 
notable proposals is the Ranked Choice Voting method. Ranked Choice Voting was first 
implemented in a state in Maine in 2018, following the lead of several US cities.94 Ranked 
Choice Voting (RCV), also known as instant runoff voting, is the electoral procedure in which 
voters rank their candidate preferences, and if no candidate wins an absolute majority in the first 
round then the lowest recipients of votes is eliminated. Then, second preferences on the ballots 
of eliminated candidates are reallocated to the surviving candidates until there is a majority 
achieved for a single candidate.95 Ultimately, rank choice voting asks voters, if not your preferred 
candidate, who would be the most reasonable second, third, and so on alternatives?96 
 Proponents of Rank Choice Voting say that this method expands the amount of people 
whose votes “matter” or have consequential effect, increases competition, and allows for more 
diverse and minority candidates to run without feeling as if they would “threaten” or “take votes 
away from” a major party candidate.97 Australia is one of several countries which has 
implemented this system (amongst Ireland, Malta, New Zealand, Scotland, and more) and often 
sees upwards of six candidates run in house elections and there is rarely talk of any of these 
minor candidates “spoiling” the election.98 Rank Choice Voting similarly, increases sincere 
voting in the sense that the system encourages rather than discourages voters to rank third party 
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candidates as a first choice.99 Scholars deem Rank Choice Voting as a more neutral system than 
the current way of voting in the sense that it does not bias campaigns and candidates to adhere to 
the interests of key battleground states or even battleground districts.100  
Additionally, scholars such as Paul D. Schumacher state that Rank Choice Voting 
increases voter participation because voters who are currently disaffected with the major party 
candidates would still feel motivated to vote since they will not be perturbed to cast a ballot for 
their preferred third party candidate.101 Rob Richie in his article, “National Implications of Maine 
Adoption of Ranked Choice Voting”, discusses how voter turnout has risen sharply in decisive 
mayoral elections in cities which have adopted this system—as compared to previous systems 
which have primaries and runoffs.102 Another common praise of the system is that it would 
diminish the probability of an extreme candidate taking office because it assumes that moderate 
voters would necessarily choose other moderate candidates as their second and third choices.103 
Ranked choice voting could reasonably avoid issues pertaining to legitimacy, since the 
winner will always receive a majority of votes. This method is also deemed “more legitimate” 
because the possibility of rogue voters and a House contingency election would most likely be 
avoided.104 Yet, it is important to envision that implementing this system would be faced with 
some resistance from Americans who are not used to crafting their electoral choices with 
multiple candidates in mind. Rank Choice Voting could therefore add some complexity to our 
current system, which many electoral reform plans (as stated in the previous section) have hoped 
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to eliminate.105 Similarly, without the ease of voting simply along party lines only, the bar is 
significantly raised for how a voter can make an informed vote with so many more options to 
consider under this plan.106 
Ranked Choice Voting appears to have many benefits, but some recent studies show that 
the benefits do not necessarily translate to results when implemented. One analysis of survey 
respondents on RCV, conducted by Lindsay Nielson in 2017, demonstrated that voters who have 
participated in RCV elections were no more likely to think that these kinds of elections produced 
fairer outcomes.107 Another study conducted by McDaniel demonstrated that in mayoral elections 
in Oakland and San Francisco California that racially polarized voting did not decrease due to 
Ranked Choice Voting and voters still used their vote to express racial interests, despite the fact 
that Ranked Choice Voting has been said to increase moderation in elections and decrease 
extremism or polarization.108 The studies act as important reminders that there might be large 
gaps between theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence about Ranked Choice Voting and 
its implications for expanding equality in our electoral system.  
 
Possibilities of a Congressional Amendment for Reform 
  
 There have been more than 700 proposals to change the Electoral College over the past 
200 years, making the Electoral College the part of the constitution with the most proposals in 
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history.109 Despite numerous reform proposals spanning decades, the Electoral College has seen 
very little structural change. In fact, there have only been a handful of times where there have 
been some slight procedural changes to how the president is elected (such as in 1887, for 
example). The only monumental constitutional shift occurred in 1804 when Congress ratified the 
Twelfth Amendment.110 The Twelfth Amendment distinguished elector ballots between president 
and vice president and solidified the role that political parties would play in the electing the 
president.111 
 Gary Bugh, in his article, The Challenges of Contemporary Electoral College Reform, 
parses through the decades of reform efforts in Congress and aggregates the data to illustrate the 
most prosperous time-periods for reform. His findings demonstrate that reform proposals were 
low between 1911 and 1960 with only 173 proposals, particularly high between 1961 and 1980 
with 433 proposals, and dropping again between 1981 and 2010 with 76 proposals.112 Proposals 
during the latest period only represent 11 percent of the 682 Electoral College proposals since 
1911.113 Most notable about this surprising statistic is that Electoral College reform activity in 
Congress did not change or improve at all after the contentious 2000 election.114 
 Bugh’s research demonstrates that the 91st Congress, the Congress between 1969 and 
1970, saw the greatest number of proposals in any single year: 106.115 Scholars such as James P. 
Melcher in his article, Exploring Difficulties of Electoral College Reform at the State Level: 
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Maine and Nebraska Lead the Way, attempt to make sense of this unique year for Congress.116 
The preceding election, the presidential election of 1968, “did a great deal to shake up the way 
that elections work in the United States”.117 For example, changes in party nomination and 
campaign strategy followed the election. Most notably, however, an Independent party 
candidate, George Wallace, ended up with 46 electoral votes, and coupled with other 
surrounding political events of 1968, Americans faith in the Electoral College was reasonably 
shaken.118 Democratic Senator Birch Evan Bayh from Indiana and Representative Emanual 
Celler from New York spearheaded the efforts to pass direct election in 1968 under the principle 
of “one person, one vote” or political equality. The plan passed in the House 338-70. While 
many had high expectations of passing the plan in the Senate after a resounding win in the 
House, Republican Senator Karl Earl Mundt from South Dakota led a minority filibuster which 
stopped the Bayh plan from seeing the Senate floor, and thus electoral reform was blocked 
again.119 
 While the 1969 reform proposals saw what may be considered the closest Congress has 
ever come to passing electoral reform, and direct election specifically, the proposal did in fact 
fail which begs the question if implementing constitutional change for electoral reform is ever 
possible. This question has bothered electoral reformers and is a primary reason for the national 
popular vote interstate compact, because it can achieve the goal of reform without the 
mountainous hurdle of an amendment. However, some scholars, such as Burdett Loomis in his 
article, Pipe Dream or Possibility? Amending the U.S. Constitution to achieve Electoral Reform, 
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express that hope remains for an amendment. Loomis looks at the 1969 reform proposal as 
Congress coming within “shouting distance” of scrapping the Electoral College and 
demonstrates that popular support will always be for a direct election system because most 
Americans do not like nor understand the Electoral College.120 However, Gary Bugh discusses 
that electoral reform has consistently been backed by Democrats from 1911 to 2010. However, 
before 1980, there was significant bipartisan support for reform, that has precipitously decreased 
since. 121 A constitutional amendment might be in the realm of possibility, but until Electoral 
College reform is presented in a bipartisan fashion once again, prospects for passing an 




 Electoral College reform is a lofty goal, but it remains in the realm of possibility. Reform 
measures which retain the framer’s vision of federalism, do not usurp the rights of small states in 
their entirety, and do not have clear partisan advantage are ripe for the possibility of ratification. 
A constitutional amendment which abolishes the Electoral College altogether and replaces it with 
direct election is impossible without bipartisan appeal, and at the moment, bipartisan support is 
unlikely. In the remainder of this thesis, the focus will be on feasible reform measures—those 
which reimagine elector allocation within the current Electoral College structure. The district 
plan, the most feasible reform option, is most worthy of in-depth review and consideration.  
Under this plan, federalism is retained, small states hold on to their power, all while the electoral 
map is expanded and participation rates increase—according to the literature. My analysis will 
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comb through these claims, evaluating if the plan delivers on its promises, pleasing both 
Electoral College supporters and reformers enough to justify altering our two-hundred-year-old 
system. 
 While electoral measures that retain the structure of electors—such as the district plan—
might be advantageous because they are feasible, they are not necessarily ideal. This literature 
review highlights the desperate cry amongst both political elites and the American public for 
fundamental electoral change which prioritizes political equality, one which expands the quantity 
of votes which “matter” beyond simply those of swing and small states. While a perfectly 
politically equal electorate is the ideal of electoral reform, concerns—those which have gained 
unavoidable attention at the tail end of the Trump era—such as recount havoc, election 
legitimacy, and campaigning strategies have reminded us why it is not entirely achievable. 
Therefore, perfect reform should not be the focus; compromise should take center-stage: reform 
must attempt to expand electorate power to the currently disenfranchised, but also be strategic in 
adhering to legitimacy and bipartisan appeal. The Constitution is the document of compromises 
and the electoral process is no exception. 
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The District Plan: Case Study Analysis 
 
The district plan appears to champion compromise: acting as a middle ground between 
federalism, political equality, and realistic electoral implementation. Maine and Nebraska, the 
two states which have already adopted the plan not only have years of data generated on the 
success of the plans but can act as studies and exemplars for any future implementation of the 
plan. Maine adopted the plan in 1969 and Nebraska in 1991.122Aside from these two states, 
Michigan briefly adopted the district plan for one election in 1892, but it was simply a one 
election experiment.123 I will briefly analyze the historical context that surrounded the decision 
for both Maine and Nebraska to ratify this plan and if the states have seen advantageous, 




 The time around which Maine ratified the district plan could be described as a “perfect 
storm” of circumstances to breed Electoral College reform. Maine ratified electoral reform in 
1969, to first be implemented in 1972. As discussed in the literature review, 1969 was the year 
which saw the most electoral reform proposals, 106. Many attribute this spike in proposals to the 
tumultuous 1968 election, where a third-party candidate, George Wallace, snagged a total of 46 
electoral votes.124 Thanks to the 1968 election and the general political upheaval and agitation 
towards progressive reform, 1969 was arguably the closest Congress has ever been to ratifying a 
plan which would abolish the Electoral College and replace it with direct election. While the plan 
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did not pass, the congressional events leading up to the plan were particularly salient for the 
people of Maine for two reasons. First, Mainers were significantly engaged in the 1968 election 
because the first Mainer since 1884, Senator Ed Muskie, was on a major party ticket.125 
Secondly, Maine representatives had been particularly engaged in Electoral College reform 
throughout the preceding decade. Most notably, Republican Senator Margaret Chase Smith (the 
first woman elected to serve in both the Senate and the House of Representatives) was an 
instrumental figure in leading electoral reform in Washington.126  Senator Smith proposed the 
Smith Plan in SJ Res. 1 which would abolish the Electoral College replacing it with direct 
election, institute a runoff procedure if no candidate received a majority, and implement a 
national primary system to nominate the President and Vice President.127 While Smith’s plan did 
not pass, it demonstrates that Maine had been exposed to conversations regarding Electoral 
College reform long before the rest of the nation. 
   In 1969, Democratic state Representative Glenn Starbird introduced a bill which would 
divide Maine into four separate districts and devote one of Maine’s four existing electoral votes 
to each of the districts. This plan was replaced only six weeks later by Republican Representative 
Raymond Rideout’s plan, the plan we know of today, which would allocate two electoral votes 
to the popular vote winners in each district, and two votes to the popular vote winner 
statewide.128 James Melcher states in his analysis of this historic period when Maine ratified the 
district plan, Exploring the Difficulties of Electoral College Reform at the State Level, that there 
were four instrumental elements which explain why Maine was able to pass such revolutionary 
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electoral reform: 1) prominent Maine political leaders, like Margaret Chase Smith, advocated for 
national electoral reform in Washington making it a salient issue for Mainers, 2) the 1968 
election sparked nationwide skepticism for the Electoral College and emphasized calls for 
reform, 3) “policy entrepreneurs” such as Glenn Starbird and Raymond Rideout were making 
substantial changes in the state not only with respect to the Electoral College but on other issues 
as well, 4) and finally the support for electoral reform was bipartisan in nature, which has been 
one of, if not, the most crucial indicators of success for electoral reform proposals throughout 
American history.129 
 Despite the revolutionary nature of Maine’s electoral shift from “winner-takes-all” to the 
district plan, 2016 and 2020 are the only two election in which the state’s two congressional 
districts voted differently.130 Despite a lack of concrete electoral changes, the district plan had 
several effects on the political experience of Mainers. According to the Maine.gov website, 
Maine has consistently been one of the states with the highest voter turnout rates in national 
elections.131 In a recent article entitled, “As Maine goes, so goes Electoral College reform, 
maybe”, the incumbent Democratic Representative Jared Golden of Maine is quoted stating: 
“There’s a lot of split tickets here…We take out own path in thought and personal lifestyle here. 
Voters here aren’t committed to individuals or parties but look at every election separately.”132 
Maine’s culture surrounding elections may have been shaped by the distinctiveness of its 
electoral system against the background of the national preference for winner-takes-all, 
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emboldening its citizens with higher levels of political efficacy, the feeling that their vote in 




 Nebraska ratified electoral reform in 1991. Unlike Maine, this change was not as a 
response to a national push toward progressive reform on electoral policy, as was the case in 
1969. In fact, Nebraska felt neglected by candidates and campaigns for years because of its 
unchanging Republican voting history. Therefore, its legislature believed that altering the system 
to a district system would bring national attention and numerous campaign visits. From 1968 to 
1988, the Republican candidate won election in Nebraska six times and did so with a resounding 
margin of an average of over thirty points. 133 Democratic representative DiAnna Schimek 
bolstered support for the district plan by reminding Republican legislators of a time when 
“Nebraska mattered” which was during Bobby Kennedy’s 11-city tour of the state in 1968 in 
order to win the state’s Democratic primary.134 Ultimately, when it came to ratifying the new 
electoral reform in Nebraska in the early nineties, James Melcher explains that, with very few 
truly competitive areas of the state, the state had “little to lose by trying the district system”. 135  
However, Nebraska was fairly disappointed by the 1992 campaign trail results, 
demonstrating that the plan’s hope to bring more political and campaign attention to the state had 
not quite met its expectations. State Senator Doug Kristensen, a then vocal opponent of the 
district plan, stated after the 1992 election: “I am not sure the presidential candidates flew over 
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Nebraska, much less stopped.”136 After the 2000 election, the secretary of state for elections 
raised concerns with the district plan’s goals stating, “we didn’t get a presidential candidate this 
year or a vice presidential candidate. We didn’t even get the presidential candidate’s wives. We 
got the vice president’s wife.”137  
Ultimately, the plan did not provide any “success” or any electoral changes until 2008, 
when Nebraska first split its electoral votes. Nebraska’s second congressional district gave one 
electoral vote to Barack Obama. This was not a coincidence, in fact, Obama’s campaign sent 
thousands of field workers to the district, which is where Omaha is located, winning the district 
by approximately 3,000 votes.138 In a 2016 speech in Omaha, after which Obama did not win any 
of the districts in Nebraska during the 2012 election, he affectionately recalled how supporters 
renamed Omaha to “Obamaha” because of the unprecedented feat of splitting the electoral votes 
in 2008.139 Obama’s victory in Nebraska’s second congressional district demonstrates that 
possibly Nebraska lawmakers were on to something when implementing the district plan. 
Perhaps, greater campaign attention would yield competitive results even in the vastly 
Republican state.  
Nebraska once again split its votes in the 2020 election, where Joe Biden won Nebraska’s 
second district as well. One of the state’s Republican electors, Steve Nelson, commented on the 
win saying that “it reflects both the level of interest in the 2020 election as well as the growing 
 
136 James P. Melcher, 136. 
137 James P. Melcher, 136. 
138 Amber Phillips, “Nebraska Is on the Verge of Changing Its Quirky Electoral College Rules. Again.,” Washington 




political power of Omaha”.140 Nebraska’s unique use of the district plan might very well be the 
driving force behind why Omaha has gained this growing political power, because without the 
plan, Omaha would wash away into irrelevance against the backdrop of the overwhelmingly red 
state. In November 2020, during the tumultuous few days between election day and the 2020 
race being called, the New York Times, among other publications, published an article entitled, 
“Could Omaha Swing the Race? In 2020, Nothing is Impossible”, indicating how consequential 
the singular electoral vote could be in one likely scenario of Electoral College paths to victory 
for Joe Biden.141 While Nebraskan lawmakers might have been disillusioned by the district plan 
in the several elections between 1992 and 2008 where there was no evidence that it was making 
any substantial changes, the 2008 and 2020 elections indicate that the plan might not be a waste 
and has a lot of untapped potential. 
Despite the 2008 excitement surrounding Nebraska’s implementation of the district plan, 
Republican lawmakers have been consistently pushing against the plan since it was enacted. In 
2008, before the election, Republican Party Chair Mark Quandahl believed that Nebraska was 
“out of step” with the rest of the nation and stated that “sometimes when a state does something 
in a different manner, people call it unique, which is a polite way of saying it is weird.”142 He 
insisted that the state scrap that plan and return to the “winner-takes-all” method like everyone 
else.143 The argument that Nebraska is somehow out of line with the rest of the nation in 
implementing this plan has become particularly salient to the state’s Republicans. In 2016, 
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Republican Senator Robert Hilkemann stated, “Why would we want to be different than all other 
48 states?” he continues, “for me it was more the principle of the thing”.144  
Democratic leaders are pushing back on this Republican conformist rhetoric, especially 
beloved Senator Ernie Chambers, who has made it his mission while in office to fight for the 
rights of marginalized communities. In Chambers’ eyes, the district plan is precisely that. In an 
interview with National Geographic, Chambers responds to Republican lawmakers’, like 
Hilkemann, efforts to abolish the system by stating: “You are not going to take away that one 
little bit of impact that people in the district have on selecting the President”.145 Megan Hunt, a 
state legislator from Omaha reiterates Chambers’ point saying that “When the conditions are 
right, Nebraska becomes a state that candidates have to pay attention to”.146 While most of the 
state does not necessarily experience the same intensity or attention that Omaha might in an 
election year and necessarily think that it should, its efforts to change the plan might overlook 
how the system creates a more equitable experience for voters that do not feel constrained to vote 
along party lines. As the New York Times article discussed above points out, the system allows 
for the same community to vote for Republicans in some elections and Democrats in others and 
empowers them to choose the candidate over the politics.147 
 
Recent Efforts for Reform 
 
As recently as January of 2021, Wisconsin has proposed a bill to enact the district plan as 
opposed to the winner-takes-all plan for allocating electoral votes. According to the Wisconsin 
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Examiner, this bill is Republican sponsored, led by Representative Gary Tauchen, and is born 
out of Donald Trump’s performance in the state where he lost its 10 electors to Joe Biden in the 
2020 election. Under the district plan, Donald Trump would have walked away with six electoral 
votes from the state, more than half. Tauchen believes the bill would better reflect Wisconsin’s, 
“diverse political landscape”.148 Critics of the plan, see the bill not as progressive but as 
dangerous. Barry Burden, founder of the Elections Research Center, warns that the plan is a 
power-hungry partisan appeal by Republicans which would ultimately lead to disastrous 
gerrymandering in a state whose districts are already drawn to a GOP advantage.149 Wisconsin, 
while still in early stage of reform, acts as a particularly salient exemplar of both the widespread 
concerns of gerrymandering and how clear partisan preferences can shoot an electoral plan in the 
foot. 
 
What to take away from Maine and Nebraska 
 
 Two states implemented the same electoral plan, the district system, for different reasons 
and during distinct political environments. Maine ratified reform during the wake of a powerful 
national reform era, where its own political leaders had been distinctively vocal in enacting 
reform, and Nebraska ratified reform in an effort to make the state more visible and 
consequential on the national stage. Analyzing the success of the district plan in aggregate by 
whether it has “split” the state’s electoral votes demonstrates that the plan has had little effect 
overall since for both states there have only two elections in which this has occurred. However, a 
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microscopic look into the political experience of the citizens in these districts demonstrate higher 
levels of political efficacy. These voters have an augmented sense that their vote may be 
consequential in the election, whereas it would otherwise be overshadowed under a ‘winner-
takes-all’ system. Lawmakers, such as those in Nebraska, have been fighting for these citizen’s 
rights, especially because this plan has given more political power to minority voters. While this 
may be the case for Maine and Nebraska, it is worth analyzing if this effect for minorities would 
persist if this plan were to become a constitutional amendment and subsequently alter the impact 






Research Problem & Methodological Approach  
 
 The research question that I address in this section is whether a national or state-level 
shift to the district plan for allocating electoral votes would provide more benefits than the 
current winner-takes-all system. In order to define “benefits” of an electoral system I will be 
assessing the relative merits of the two system on seven separate criteria: Legitimacy, 
Inclusiveness, Neutrality, Simplicity, Equality, Participation, and Feasibility. I was inspired to 
utilize this methodological approach due to a similar variant of this method was utilized in Paul 
D. Schumaker’s 2010 article, “The Good, the Better, the Best: Improving on the Acceptable 
Electoral College” in which he compared the direct election method and instant runoff methods 
to the current Electoral College system using nine criteria.150 I will differentiate myself from 
Schumaker’s work by assessing these seven criteria quantitatively, whereas Schumacher relies 
heavily on qualitative analysis. 
 I decided that this criterion-based method would be the most effective way to compare 
the two electoral systems because “benefits” of an electoral system can be subjective. The 
Electoral College, as is, has many benefits, yet it is still consistently under fire for being unfair, 
antiquated, and unnecessary. Therefore, by imploring a broad analysis and evaluating these 
systems with regards to several different key and valuable elements of the electoral process, I can 
hopefully make a better informed, nuanced interpretation of the results and determine which 
system might provide greater benefits. One of the key elements of my methodological approach 
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when comparing and contrasting between the two systems, when appropriate within the criteria, 
will be to assess the differences between swing places -- states in one system and districts in the 
other. One of the major questions I faced when designing my analysis was how to define a 
“swing place”. While there are many metrics to define a swing state—campaign events, expert 
predictions, media interactions—those same metrics do not necessarily exist on the district level. 
Therefore, in order to remain consistent between the two types of swing places, “swing” level 




 Comparing the district system to the current electoral system proves challenging because 
there are less little data regarding how presidential elections operate on the district level than 
state level. However, I was able to find district-level presidential election returns for the 2016 
election. After contacting Penn Libraries, I was able to gain access to the Dave Leip’s Atlas for 
U.S. Presidential Elections, where I was able to uncover presidential election returns data by 
congressional district.151 This dataset will make up my interpretation of “swing district” by 
specifically utilizing the margin of victory column. My contact at Penn Libraries, Lauris Olson, 
advised me that the presidential election returns by district are difficult to acquire, and expensive, 
and I should focus on 2016 election returns exclusively for this reason.  Therefore, my analysis 
will be centered around the 2016 election only when discussing the district level returns. As for 
states, accessing information on margin of victory for the 2016 election and beyond is easily 
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accessible. I utilized data I retrieved off of the Federal Election Commission’s website regarding 
2016 election returns by state.152 
 
Methodological Approach by Criteria 
 
 Each of the seven separate criteria for analysis required a different methodological 
procedure. I will discuss these below by criteria. 
Legitimacy 
 
 The literature review highlighted the discrepancy in the debate surrounding how to 
determine electoral legitimacy. One method determines that legitimacy can be conferred based 
on ease of recounts and elimination of the possibility for electoral fraud. Another method finds 
any alteration to our current system as weakening electoral legitimacy. Additionally, a third 
method envisions legitimacy in the Electoral College as consistency between the Electoral 
College winner and the popular vote winner, because under these conditions the Electoral 
College accurately reflects the “will of the people.” While uncommon, a discrepancy between 
the national popular vote winner and the Electoral College winner occurred in 2016. In order to 
accurately access which of the two electoral systems provide the most legitimate result I will 
analyze the legitimacy as defined under the final method listed above: I will compare the actual 
electoral votes from the winner-takes-all system, to the electoral votes under the hypothetical 
district system for the 2016 election in order to discern if there still remains a discrepancy 
between popular vote winner and electoral winner, or if a gap still persists but is significantly 
diminished or increased with a shift in electoral system. 
 





 Inclusiveness is defined as who is included in the electoral process, i.e., whose votes 
matter and where do campaigns focus their energy as a result of where votes matter. While there 
is no campaign data by congressional district, I approximated that campaigns would visit the 
states which included one or more swing or close congressional district. I will compare the states 
where either the Trump or Clinton campaigns held public events in 2016 to the states which hold 
swing districts in 2016. I will utilize this metric to assess if “inclusiveness” increases or 
decreases across the two systems. In order to analyze the campaign visits by state for the 2016 




 The main methodological question behind neutrality is, does one electoral system 
advantage a demographic group more than the other and would that bias shift from one electoral 
system to another? The demographic factors of interest are median household income, 
educational attainment, percent white, and unemployment rate. I will compare these factors by 
margin of victory in both swing states and district to determine if one or more of these factors 
can be predictive of swing places. If one of these factors are predictive of a low margin of 
victory, I will gain insight into if these electoral systems benefit certain groups over others. I 
retrieved demographic data from the census website for the 116th Congress.154 
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 Simplicity is defined as how easy it is for citizens to understand the electoral system. I 
believe the best way to gauge knowledge and understanding of an electoral system is to utilize 
public opinion data. In this part of the analysis, I will analysis the results of one survey 
conducted by Pew Research Center in late October to early November of 2019, asking basic 




 Equality is defined as the equal distribution of voting power in the electoral process. 
First, I will analyze voting power under the current system. I will conduct this analysis by 
dividing the number of electoral votes by state by population in order to determine if residents 
have the same level of voting power regardless of which state they live in. While I might not be 
surprised to find that this is not the case, I will be looking more closely at the degree to which 
this change between large and small states. Since electoral votes by state does not change with a 
shift to the district plan, in order to detect any differences between the systems, I will analyze 
how cumulative population between districts and states changes as margin increases. Through 
this method, I will gain insight into whether close states or close districts will represent a include 
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 For participation, Maine and Nebraska will act as prime examples and case studies for the 
increase or decrease in voter turnout as a result of the district plan. Comparing these voter 
turnout statistics overtime, before and after each state implemented the new plan, to the national 
voter turnout statistics, will help control for elections which were better nationwide at mobilizing 




 Feasibility is defined as the ability for the district system to actually be implemented as 
law, through a constitutional amendment or on the state level. A case study review of Maine and 
Nebraska’s reasons for implementing the district system, as seen in the previous section, does not 
provide clear evidence for optimal conditions for ratifying the plan. However, bipartisan support 
was critical for both states in passing legislation, and therefore is a key metric for gaining some 
insight into whether states could be successful at changing their electoral system. This section 








The 2016 election brought challenges and questions of electoral legitimacy to center-
stage; it was one of four elections in American history in which the winner of the Electoral 
College did not win the popular vote. Many critics of the Electoral College call on the 
discrepancy between the Electoral College winner and the popular vote winner to be one of the 
strongest justifications for reform because it delegitimizes the results of the Electoral College. At 
the same time, proponents of the Electoral College celebrate the current winner-takes-all system 
because of how efficiently it translates popular vote margins into electoral wins. Legitimacy and 
how to define it lies at the crux of the debate. In my analysis, I detect if there was any difference 
in electoral winner under a hypothetical 2016 district system, wherein the winner of the popular 
vote, Hillary Clinton, would have also won a majority of Electoral College votes. Below, the 



















The data demonstrate if the district plan had been adopted in 2016, in fact, Donald Trump 
would have still won the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote. In one view of 
“legitimacy” this result determines no consequential difference between the two systems. A 
deeper dive into the results, however, shows that the electoral discrepancy between popular vote 
winner and Electoral College winner is smaller under the district system. Donald Trump would 
have still surpassed 270 electoral votes, but he would have not reached 300 votes or higher. In 
fact, his resounding electoral win under the current system is diminished under the district 
system, in which he loses 16 votes. The following graph depicts electoral vote shares across the 
two systems compared to popular vote shares, providing a deeper insight into how effectively the 
two systems translate vote margins.  
 
 
 Here, a visual depiction of how the 2016 popular vote compared to the electoral vote 
shares across the two systems demonstrates a closer estimate of translating popular vote margins 
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into electoral wins, raising questions of whether the winner-takes-all system should be revered 
for how it reflects popular vote margins. The margin of victory in the Electoral College under the 
current system is 13%, whereas under the district system it is only 8%. Therefore, a margin of 
victory of 8% is a closer representation of the popular vote.  
The district system does not provide resounding differences in legitimacy as compared to 
winner-takes-all. This is relevant because in 2016, most of the complaints surrounded who won 
the election not the margin of victory. In essence, the confusion and uncertainty of this unusual 
election—with a discrepancy between popular vote winner and Electoral College winner—would 
persist under the alternative district plan. However, analyzing the margins of victory of the two 
plans side by side reveals the Electoral College under winner-takes-all is non-ideal for translating 
popular vote margins. Therefore, under the district system there is more legitimacy to the 
electoral winner, even if it cannot appropriately correct for popular vote losses. Bearing in mind, 





 With electoral reform comes massive structural changes to how campaigns are managed. 
Critics of the Electoral College are angered that many states are ignored by campaigns, which 
illuminates larger structural issues with the system; it creates a crisis of inclusion in our 
democratic process, where campaigns prioritize the needs of select voters. In fact, the desire for 
campaign attention was the driving force behind why Nebraska decided to shift to the district 
system in 1991.156 The below graphs, which shows campaign events per campaign by state, and 
 
156 James P. Melcher, 133. 
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are taken from FairVote, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization whose mission is to advocate for 
electoral solutions. 157 FairVote carefully tallied 2016 election campaign events by state. The data 
in the graphs only include events that were open to the public or whose primary purpose was to 
influence local voters in the area in which the event occurred. Examples of these events were 
rallies, speeches, fairs and town-hall meetings.158 
  
The data is clear: The Trump campaign prioritized a narrow group of states across the 
country. During his 2016 campaign, only 12 states received more than 1 campaign visit by 
Donald Trump, with 3 states—Florida, North Carolina, and Ohio—receiving a largely unequal 
distribution of over 30 events. Based on FairVote’s calculation, over the course of the election 
 
157 “94% of 2016 Presidential Campaign Was in Just 12 Closely Divided States,” National Popular Vote, August 16, 
2016, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/campaign-events-2016. 
158 “2016 Presidential Candidate General Election Events Tracker (Maintained by FairVote),” Google Docs, accessed 




season, Donald Trump held approximately 248 public campaign events in which 88.31% of them 
were held in the “swing states” listed above. Hillary Clinton, according to FairVote’s 
calculations throughout the election cycle, had fewer campaign events than Donald Trump, 
spanning an even smaller portion of states, illustrated below. 
 
The Clinton campaign held public events in nearly the same twelve states as the Trump 
campaign.  Both campaigns included Florida and North Carolina in their top three priority states 
on the trail. Bearing in mind, even though these events are only a piece of the interactions 
between campaigns and voters by state, the incidence of these events still reveal a harrowing 
depiction of inclusiveness. Only a few states are prioritized, with an even smaller few getting a 
disproportionate amount of attention. It is challenging to know how campaigns would adapt to an 
entirely new electoral system. Even more, how campaigning in certain places which are deemed 
swing districts over other districts might have a positive reinforcing effect, making them more 
competitive and susceptible to campaign attention over time. However, an analysis of swing 
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districts in the 2016 election—which was determined by isolating the districts which saw a 
margin of victory under 10%—illustrates a very different picture of what campaigning might 
look like under this new electoral system. The below graph explicates the number of swing 
districts in each state based on 2016 presidential election returns. 
 
  
As opposed to the limited twelves states which the Trump and Clinton campaigns visited 
in 2016, under the district system the electoral map expands. Now, over half of the state, 26, 
have either one or more swing districts, which could warrant the state a campaign visit at some 
point during the election process. How to assume campaigns would respond under a hypothetical 
system without any concrete historical evidence is challenging, however if there is a larger 
spread of places with tighter partisan margins, then campaigns will need to fight for their 
attention. Since congressional districts are small compared to states, neighboring districts, even 
those which are not marginal, might feel energized by campaign events happening in nearby 
districts, creating a spillover effect.  
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States which have high numbers of swing districts under this hypothetical system are the 
largest states with many districts clustered in one area. Campaigns, therefore, might 
disproportionately visit larger states. As depicted in the graphic above which shows California’s 
districts by margin, California could potentially be one of the most visited states by campaigns 
because of its sheer number of congressional districts, 53. Under the winner-takes-all system, 
California is reliably blue. However, under the district system, with the potential for more 
attention from campaigns, California might increase in competitiveness. Other prominent states 
on the map under the district plan are the other large states with several districts, such as New 
Jersey, New York, and Texas. These states are historically neglected by campaigns, but the data 
reveals that this has the possibility to change. 
Despite newfound large-state prevalence, the twelve swing states such as Florida, 
Pennsylvania, Ohio identified above are still relevant swing places in the district system. 
However, they might be forced to “share the campaign spotlight” under a district-dominant 
electoral map. Electoral College conservatives find reform to switch to direct election system 
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unacceptable because of the dominance of large states such as Texas, California, and New York 
on the electoral map—the very thing the Electoral College has tried to prevent by giving small 
states power with the additional two senatorial electoral votes per state. Yet, while larger states 
might receive more attention by campaigns under this new system, small states still retain the 
same level of power as before since the number of electoral votes by state has not changed. 
While swing states prove to have powerful influence on who is prioritized during the 
election, those same places are unfairly advantaged while presidents are in office as well. 
According to Brendan J. Doherty’s research on state-level visits by presidents while they are in 
office, presidential attention and neglect are related to the geographic patterns which are 
governed by the Electoral College.159 Therefore, electoral reform that expands campaign 
inclusiveness not only improves the democratic process but also holds drastic policy and 
governance implications as well. For example, Donald Trump took noticeable inaction against 
California wildfires while in office, and while that may have been a result of his fervent denial of 
climate change and its effects, California’s irrelevance to his electoral gains in the 2020 election 
may have further augmented his refusal to provide appropriate federal aid and attention to the 
crisis.160 Overall, the district plan is more inclusive from a campaigning perspective than the 
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 Not only is a non-biased, neutral system the most likely to pass congressional approval 
and garner an amendment, but it is also the most just. In this section, I will analyze the neutrality 
concerns for the district system as compared to winner-takes-all by detecting any demographic 
biases. Swing places—either districts or states—hold the power in a presidential election. 
Analyzing demographic factors such as income, education level, percent white, and 
unemployment levels in these key areas can give a sense of which demographic groups hold 
power in this electoral process. A comparison between systems, therefore, can show if there is a 
shift in demographic bias or not when adopting the district plan. 
 
Figure 1 Predicting Swing States by Demographic Factors 
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 The above decision tree depicts which demographic factors influence swing states under 
the winner-takes-all system. The decision tree demonstrates that demographic factors are not a 
strong predictor of whether a state is swing or not. The leaf node which gives the lowest value 
for margin, 9.502% is predicted only by the demographic variable of median household income. 
This result shows that states with a median household income somewhere between $51,918/year 
and $58,848/year are predictive of a small margin of victory, or a swing place. Even so, a margin 
of 9.502% is not the closest or most “swing-like’ margin, which proves further evidence that 
demographic factors are weak predictors. Therefore, for swing states, there are other important 
predictor characteristics that are not demographic in nature which predict their small margin of 








The above eight regression plots demonstrate the correlations of these four demographic 
factors on margin of victory within these states and districts across the two systems. For all four 
of the characteristics across both states and districts the correlations are both weak and non-
linear. Additionally, in both systems we see a lot of noise around the lowess smoothing lines. As 
with the decision tree above, these plots demonstrate further that demographic variables alone 
are poor predictors of margin both in states and in districts. However, on average, middle ground 
demographic characteristics—middle income, percent white, educational attainment, and 
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unemployment rate—are the best predictors of these swing places between both systems. Despite 
these correlations being weak, they are consistent across all demographic characteristics which 
strengthens this argument further. In addition, while the lowess line is smooth for the district 
plots, the line appears to be jagged for the state plots. The jaggedness of this lowess line is due to 
the smaller number of data points (only 50 states versus 435 districts) used in these regression 
plot. Despite the smaller sample size, however, the trend is still intact, and this is not necessarily 
a display of randomness. 
While the two sets of regression plots have similar demographic features, the plots which 
represent the district system appear to have a bias towards white residents. As seen in the 
Percent White on Margin by District graph, all the districts which have a percent white score of 
.5 or lower have a considerably high margin of victory, indicating low levels of “swing district-
ness”. Alternatively, those districts which have low margins of victory are saturated with white 
voters. In fact, an overwhelming majority of “swing districts” have high levels of percent white 
residents. Therefore, while the two systems display strikingly similar demographic populations, 
the district system presents a considerable bias towards white voters. This bias is notable because 
it contributes to the disenfranchisement of minority voters in our political process. 
Overall, the data demonstrating that demographics are considerably weak predictors of 
swing places in either system is not shocking, even while the district system presents a white 
bias. These demographic factors—income, educational attainment, race, and unemployment 
levels—are largely strong predictors of partisanship at the extremes. Therefore, in the places 
which are average in nearly all of these characteristics, we would expect to see the highest levels 
of competitiveness. Those Americans in the middle continue to hold the greatest power, district 
or otherwise. Ultimately, however, the slight demographic shift which empowers white voters 
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under the district systems causes for both alarm and caution if it were to be formally 
implemented nationwide. Since the district system favors white voters, its implementation would 
be detrimental to incorporate into an electoral system where minorities already experience 




 As stated early in this thesis in the literature review, the ability to understand our 
country’s electoral system is essential to citizens’ willingness to participate in it. Greater internal 
political efficacy or the self-perception that an individual is capable of understanding politics—
provides more citizens with the competence and thus the confidence to participate in political 
acts such as (and most importantly to an electoral system) voting.161  Many Americans are 
confused by our antiquated, unnecessary, and clunky electoral system. Below, the graph 
discusses the results from a recent public opinion survey, conducted in 2019, by Pew Research 
Center. The survey asked the question amongst a sample of adults nationwide:  
As you may know, presidents are chosen not by direct popular vote, but by the Electoral 
College in which each state casts electoral votes. What determines the number of 
electoral votes a state has?... The number of voters in the state, the number of seats the 
state has in the United States House and Senate (Correct), the number of counties in the 
state, each state has the same number of electoral votes”.162 
 
161 Stephen C. Craig and Michael A. Maggiotto, 84. 
162 Pew Research Center, “Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Pew Research Center: American 
Trends Panel Wave 57, Ipsos, (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 2019), 




As seen in the figure, while the plurality of survey respondents states the correct answer, 
at 39%, a significant number said the wrong answer, the number of voters in the state, at 28% 
and an almost equivalent amount responded with, Not Sure at 26%. Therefore, when aggregating 
these numbers, a total of 54% of Americans surveyed either have incorrect knowledge about the 
Electoral College or are simply unsure about the answer. While this survey question fields only 
one specific area of the knowledge surrounding the Electoral College, and arguably it is a 
specific fact regarding the Electoral College that is not entirely essential to participating in it, it is 
certainly emblematic of a widespread problem that Americans are uninformed with how our 
system works and why it is the way it is. Understandably, the Electoral College is confusing, and 
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therefore, in implementing the district plan, we should not expect an increase in the level of ease 
with understanding the Electoral College, rather it would make the whole system even more 
complex. Therefore, while the Electoral College is complex, confusing, and widely 
misunderstood by many Americans, the district system would be even more complex, confusing, 
and require Americans to adapt to a whole new system while they may have never even fully 




 Small states are powerful in this electoral system. Due to the additional two senatorial 
electoral votes that each state is granted in the Electoral College, the states with the smallest 
populations have substantial if not disproportionate power when it comes to presidential 
elections. Dividing up the electoral votes per each state by the population could be an effective 
measure for determining voter power per person by state. For example, below are two graphs, 
one which represents population by state. The other graph depicts voting power by state, in 
which I divided the number of electoral votes by the population in each state. While voters rarely 
think of their individual voting power when deciding when to vote, and everyone’s voting power 
is astronomically tiny in the grand scheme and therefore cannot be a true evaluation of power on 
the individual level, comparing how voting power varies on aggregate by state underscores just 





 As seen above, California, Florida, New York, and Texas have enormous populations 
which overpower the rest of the country. However, on an electoral level, voters in those states 
hold very little voting power as depicted in the second graph. Whereas, Wyoming, Vermont, 
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Arkansas, and North Dakota, states which have well under a million residents, dominate in terms 
of electoral voting power. The Electoral College is inherently unequal between states and 

















 While both the district system and the current winner-takes-all method use the 
Electoral College in the same way, in the sense that they allocate the same number of electoral 
votes to the same states, voting power per individual does not differ state to state. However, we 
can analyze voting power instead of sheer voting power per person, as whether there is an 
increase of the number of people who live in swing places between the two systems because the 
residents of swing districts often get the most attention from campaigns, politicians while in 
office, and get out the vote measures. Therefore, it is important to note whether swing districts 
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and swing states would incorporate a greater swath of the population, thereby giving greater 
voting power to more individuals around the country. Ultimately, as seen in the graph above, this 
is not the case. Even though there may be more individual swing districts, this effect is 
diminished when accounting for population.  
 A smaller number of states gives more people greater voting power than a large 
number of districts. For example, as we can see in the graph, for a margin of victory in the 2016 
election of approximately 10% or lower, nearly 100 million people are represented in those areas 
in the winner takes all method, but only 50 million people are represented under the district plan. 
I think this is a surprising finding because we might expect that a larger number of competitive 
districts across the country would result in a greater reach, however this is not the case. This 
section demonstrates that the Electoral College is wildly unequal, and that inequality would not 
change with a shift to district from the winner-takes-all system. Furthermore, even fewer people 
would be in the most competitive areas across the country, demonstrating one powerful way in 
which the current system is better than a proposed electoral shift to congressional districts.  
 Of course, the data represented in the graph, Margin in 2016 Election by 
Population, States vs. Districts, only utilizes marginal returns from one of the elections so it is 
difficult to confidently say if this result perfectly maps onto other elections and can be 
generalized. However, this one election certainly gives some semblance of an idea of how swing 




 We crave an electoral system which will maximize voter turnout. On one hand, high 
voter turnout rates could indicate a healthy and well-functioning democracy. On the other hand, 
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high voter turnout rates could indicate frustration and a need for change on the part of the 
national government, especially during presidential election years. Whichever way voter turnout 
is interpreted as a reflection of our democracy, it is more important to this analysis, however, to 
determine the electoral method which maximizes voter turnout.  Below is a graph of national 
























National voter turnout rates are relatively stable over time, existing between slightly 
under 55% and never passing 70%. There are some significant elections, which saw spikes in 
turnout, for example the 2008 and 2020 elections. In 2008, voter turnout was the highest since 
the late 1960s as seen in the graph, which many attribute to the fact that 2008 was a historic 
election with Barack Obama’s candidacy.163 Furthermore, it was no doubt that the 2020 election 
 
163 Jason L. Riley, “Opinion | What’s So Great About High Voter Turnout?”, Wall Street Journal, 4 November 2020, 
sect. Opinion, https://www.wsj.com/articles/whats-so-great-about-high-voter-turnout-11604446984. 
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was historic as well, which saw record voter turnout. In 2020, instead of high voter turnout 
reflecting a well-functioning democracy, many people swarmed the polls mostly due to deep 
frustration and anger with the current political system. Maintaining high voter turnout over time 
is a goal of electoral reformers, regardless of isolated, historic events which have prompted 
short-term bursts in participation. 
In order to understand if a transition to the district system would have any effect on voter 
turnout and participation, I would need to analyze how voter participation rates have changed in 





Above is a graph of the national voter turnout rate subtracted from the Nebraska voter 
turnout rates from 1980 to 2020, therefore showing Nebraska’s voter turnout rates compared to 
the national averages. One of the important things to note about the graph is that there are no 
values below 0, which indicates that turnout in Nebraska is consistently higher than the national 
average. However, Nebraska had relatively high voter turnout compared with the national 
averages before the significant date of 1992—the year when the state implemented the district 
plan. Overall, Nebraska has high voter turnout nationally, but it does not seem that the different 






















 Maine, on the other hand, tells a very different story. Voter turnout in Maine is 
consistently high. In many election years, Maine demonstrates a voter turnout rate well above the 
national average, most years 10 percentage points above the national average. Voter turnout rates 
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in Maine saw a substantial increase in the several decades which followed the implementation of 
the district plan which was in 1968. While these results cannot say anything casual about the 
district plan and how it has directly impacted voter turnout in these states, we can use voter 
turnout rates and district plan implementation to understand any correlational effects at play. 
Both states demonstrate higher than average voter turnout rates. However, each state tells a 
different story about how voter turnout has changed after the implementation of the plan. For 
example, in Maine voter turnout skyrocketed, and in Nebraska it tapered off.  
Ultimately, it is difficult to discern if a third variable is a play here, and maybe there is a 
cultural difference which both states have, which not only drives their voter turnout rates to be 
higher than the national averages, but also motivated their citizens and policymakers to make a 
distinct political change by altering their electoral systems. Overall, however, it is undeniable 
that these two distinct states with the district plan have increased participation compared to other 
states across the country and that should not go unnoticed when evaluating the effect that the 




 Electoral reform is extremely difficult to pass on the national level because of the 
necessity of a constitutional amendment. Nearly 700 reform proposals have been brought to 
congress over the past 200 years demanding reform in our electoral process, yet very few actual 
changes have been enacted as a result.164 What will it take, then, to see any sort of changes over 
the next several decades if the past has proven to be dismal regarding the prospects of electoral 
change? I have focused on the district plan precisely because I believe of all the electoral plans it 
 
164 Burdett A. Loomis, 224. 
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is the one which is most ripe for implementation. Not only have two states already implemented 
the plan, which proves promising because its already actually happened, it is the plan which 
closely aligns with the structures of the Electoral College already in place—therefore it is not 
asking for anything as revolutionary as perhaps, a direct election method might ask for.  
The district plan maintains the same number of electoral votes as the winner-takes-all 
method which indicates that small states might be open to the plan because they are not giving 
up their disproportionate power. Therefore, small states might be more willing to give the plan 
consideration when proposed to congress, whereas that would be unlikely with a direct election 
proposal. Therefore, maintaining federalism is an important feature of the Electoral College that 
many congressmen are dedicated to maintaining in any electoral proposal. Therefore, a plan, 
such as the district plan, which maintains federalism, is not entirely destined for failure. 
When analyzing the two states which have been successful at implementing the plan, 
there is little that they have in common. Therefore, the factors which contribute directly to 
success are unclear. Maine, for example, implemented the plan because the state’s legislators 
were deeply involved in national electoral reform after a tumultuous national election which 
sparked skepticism regarding the Electoral College. Nebraska, on the other hand, implemented 
the plan for a very different reason. Nebraska, not at all a swing state, in fact a consistently and 
overwhelmingly red state, felt that the district plan might encourage more campaign attention 
and candidate foot-traffic to the state. However, the one thing which the states did have in 
common is that they had bipartisan support behind the plan. Therefore, bipartisan support is most 
likely the greatest indicator of success for implementing the district plan, or any electoral plan 




The above map visually illustrates the 2016 election returns by congressional district, 
specifically demonstrating the places which saw the closest margins. This map gives clarity as to 
which states might be most likely to successfully implement a change in how their electoral 
votes are allocated. States which have both red and blue districts with close margins, 
demonstrating gains for partisans on both sides of the aisle, for example, Nevada, Oregon, or 
New Mexico, might be ripe for this monumental political change. Furthermore, large states such 
as New York, New Jersey, California may find the plan a worthwhile investment because it 
would draw attention from candidates to their states in a system where they are consistently seen 
as not “worth it” because they are consistently blue. On the other hand, however, these blue 
giants, which are ultimately controlled primarily by democrats, might not want to provide any 
opportunities for the states to split electoral votes, giving any additional electoral votes to 
Republicans, even if that might increase campaign attention. Therefore, large blue states such as 
these could be of the least likely of all of the states to implement the district plan. 
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Ultimately, it is impossible to predict which places might implement electoral reform 
since so few places have effectively and successfully called for reform. However, we can begin 
to address the question of how feasible reform is by analyzing the bipartisan nature of certain 
places because as we have learned from Nebraska and Maine, that is the key element for 
electoral reform success. 
 
Conclusion of Results 
 
 To summarize, the following table illustrates the findings of this results section, 
comparing the current electoral system under winner-takes-all to the proposed district plan. The 
shaded areas represent the plan which “wins out” when comparing the two plans. If there is no 
clear plan which is better, the Electoral College winner-takes-all method would dominate 
because it is the current system in place and therefore is preferable because it would not require 
reform. 
 
Criterion Electoral College:  
Winner-Takes-All Method 
Electoral College: 
The District Plan 
Legitimacy Celebrated for translating popular 
vote margins well; can produce 
illegitimate elections where there is 
a discrepancy between Electoral 
College and popular vote winner 
(rare)   
Better translation of popular vote 
margins into electoral votes; can also 
produce illegitimate elections which has 
a discrepancy between Electoral College 
and popular vote winner (rare) 
Inclusiveness Limited number of states which are 
deemed worthwhile to campaign in, 
creating an exclusive electoral map 
Many more states which would include a 
“swing district”, has the potential to 
expand campaigning and have spillover 
effects 
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Neutrality Weak demographic bias, middle of 
the road places greatest indicator of 
swing states  
Weak but WHITE demographic bias, 
middle of the road places greatest 
indicator of swing districts  
Simplicity Complex to understand, might 
discourage political efficacy  
Would necessarily be even more 
complex to understand with additional 
caveats to the current Electoral College 
system  
Equality Despite smaller states residents 
having disproportionate voting 
power in Electoral College; swing 
states encompass many more voters 
than swing districts 
Small states continue to hold 
disproportionate voting power and far 
fewer people represented in swing 
districts than in swing states 
Participation Discourages participation in many 
states which residents do not feel as 
if their vote can make a difference 
Nebraska and Maine have consistently 
higher turnout rates; Maine sees a spike 
in turnout rates after implementation of 
the plan, Nebraska does not. 
Feasibility No change required Would require amendment or state 
ratification, but possible—two states 
have done it! Bipartisan support in states 
is the key 
 
While these categories are not entirely black and white, and it is not easy to discern a 
perfect “winner”, analyzing these results on several metrics can give insight into which option 
might be more worthwhile for the country. Despite, the close tie between the two plans as 
explicated by my results and in the table above, it is still unclear if going through the hurdles of 
implementing an entirely new electoral plan nationwide are worth the benefits of the plan. This 






 My results do not provide resounding evidence in favor of electoral reform. There are 
criteria in which the district plan provides more benefits than the current winner-takes-all system, 
however they are neither numerous nor profound. For example, the district plan might help to 
better legitimatize elections than the current system because it better translates popular vote 
margins into electoral wins. However, this benefit is only marginal since the district plan would 
not have changed the mismatch between the popular vote winner and the Electoral College 
winner in the 2016 election. Furthermore, the district plan might expand the states in which 
campaigns prioritize leading up to the election because there are smaller swing areas in many 
states across the country instead of a handful of swing states. However, this effect can be 
overshadowed by the fact that the winner-takes-all method, while prioritizing a smaller number 
of swing states, still includes a larger number of voters nationwide than the district plan would.  
The voter participation rates in Maine and Nebraska are higher than the national average 
which could be attributed to the district plan, in which residents in these key districts might feel 
that their votes matter more than other places in the country driving them to vote. However, I 
wonder if this plan were to be extended to the rest of the nation, if the “uniqueness” felt by these 
voters would persist nationally and the district plan would have an increased effect on voter 
turnout. Alternatively, there could be a third variable at play with Maine and Nebraska, wherein 
the same motivation behind voting is the same political motivation which encouraged both states 
to adopt a unique electoral plan. Not to mention, the district plan has a bias towards white voters 
which is concerning. This evident bias could be the nail-in-the-coffin finding to justify not 
implementing the plan nationwide. Clearly, adopting the district plan is feasible because it has 
been done before. However, it certainly would not be easy. Especially on the national level, as 
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history has clearly shown, passing an electoral reform amendment is nearly impossible. 
Therefore, as my results have shown, the benefits of a new electoral plan are few and far 
between. I am led to ask myself if it would be worth it at all. 
Ultimately, my research has left me with a newfound appreciation for the Electoral 
College; this is shocking to me due to the fact that I despised our current electoral system at the 
beginning of my research journey. At first glance, the Electoral College is seemingly corrupt, 
unfair, and antiquated, but I have developed a deeper understanding for the tradeoffs which have 
to exist to make an electoral system function. After careful analysis, the only solution which 
exists for the Electoral College is either to keep it and embrace it or to abolish it all together and 
adopt direct election. To me, no Electoral College replacement—district plan or otherwise—is 
particularly worth the national strife we would need to undertake to get there. Direct election, of 
course, comes with its own consequences. Aside from passing an amendment which would be 
extraordinarily arduous, election fraud would be significantly difficult to address and contain. 
Before November 2020, I would not have considered this to be a significant strike against the 
direct election plan, however with the increase in election fraud claims by the president and other 
high-ranking officials under a historically trusted and respected system, in addition to a violent 
insurrection on our capitol as a result of these bogus claims, increasing the chances for fraud is a 
risk we cannot take.   
The United States needs a powerful force to motivate a complete overhaul of our current 
electoral process. Unfortunately, the political climate of today does not prove to be ripe for the 
circumstances of grand, structural electoral change. Hopefully, one day, we will be able to live in 
an America which can withstand the growing pains of revolutionary electoral reform, so that we 
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